Active-Directory

TL;DR - An assumed-breach, Kerberos-only box starting with ryan.naylor:HollowOct31Nyt. A share holds a password-protected Access_Review.xlsx, cracked with John, which leaks cleartext creds for svc_ldap and svc_iis. BloodHound shows svc_ldap has WriteSPN over svc_winrm, so I add an SPN and kerberoast it, crack the hash, and get a WinRM shell (user.txt). svc_ldap is in restore_users, so I restore the deleted user todd.wolfe from the AD Recycle Bin, decrypt his DPAPI-protected credentials to get jeremy.combs, use a leaked SSH key to log in as svc_backup, and from there grab ntds.dit + SYSTEM, dump the hashes, and pass-the-key as Administrator for root.txt. ...

TL;DR - A long one. A boolean LDAP injection on the intranet lets me log in as kathryn.holland with */*, then brute-force the password of gitea_temp_principal. Inside Gitea the Ghost CMS repo has a path traversal that reads /proc/self/environ for the DEV_INTRANET_KEY, and the dev API behind that key has a command injection, which gives me a shell in a Linux container running as root. Its env leaks intranet_principal, a real domain account. From there it is all AD: kerberoast adfs_gmsa, grab a cached Kerberos ticket for florence.ramirez, coerce justin.bradley with a fake DNS record plus Responder and crack his hash (user.txt). justin can read the adfs_gmsa gMSA password, so I forge a Golden SAML to log into the ADFS-protected MSSQL console, pivot through a linked server to PRIMARY, impersonate sa for RCE, abuse SeImpersonate to get SYSTEM on corp.ghost.htb, and finally forge a cross-domain Golden Ticket to own ghost.htb and grab root.txt. ...

TL;DR — Port 8443 runs PWM, a self-service password portal, and SMB allows anonymous/guest access. That guest read on the Development share exposes Ansible automation whose PWM role holds ansible-vault encrypted secrets. Cracking the vault (ansible2john + john) and decrypting it gives the PWM admin svc_pwm:pWm_@dm!N_!23. Inside PWM I point the LDAP profile at a rogue server (plain ldap://389) and Responder captures svc_ldap:lDaP_1n_th3_cle4r! in cleartext — a WinRM user (user.txt). Finally, ADCS (the CorpVPN / ESC1 template) plus an LDAP shell adding my user to Domain Admins lands Administrator and root.txt. ...

TL;DR - A single forest with two domains in a parent-child trust (old.velocity.hacklu migrated into velocity.hacklu). A leftover svc_test (password = username) and a Kerberoasted svc_granite_sync:Granite00 give a foothold on the old DC. The parent has NTLM disabled, so I cross the within-forest trust with a Kerberos TGT, read the svc_backup_gmsa managed password, and use it to reach the Backup$ share holding an NTDS.dit export. secretsdump yields the old krbtgt, and a Golden Ticket forged with the AES key plus the parent’s Enterprise Admins SID in SID History (no SID filtering within a forest) escalates from Domain Admin on the child to Enterprise Admin across the entire forest. ...

TL;DR - Null-auth SMB on the member server exposes the WDS REMINST share, whose unattend XML leaks svc_deploy:D3pl0y!_AgileCorp (base64 with the classic trailing Password quirk). BloodHound shows svc_deploy has GenericWrite over the SRV-BASELINE GPO, so pyGPOAbuse drops an immediate scheduled task that gives SYSTEM / local admin on SRV. Looting SRV yields the SRV$ machine hash and an email revealing the DC pulls WSUS updates over HTTPS. I hijack the WSUS DNS record (insecure dynamic update) to point at SRV, mint a legitimate ADCS WebServer cert for the WSUS name, and stand up a rogue WSUS (pyWSUS + socat TLS + a Ligolo pivot) that serves a Microsoft-signed PsExec as a SYSTEM ‘update’ - landing local admin on the DC, then DCSync for full domain compromise." ...

TL;DR - A Domain Controller exposing a Replication share over anonymous SMB leaks a Groups.xml containing a GPP-encrypted password. Microsoft published the AES key for GPP, so it decrypts offline to the svc_tgs credentials, which open the Users share and user.txt. The Administrator account has an SPN registered, so a Kerberoast against it yields a TGS hash that cracks with rockyou, giving full domain compromise. Recon Starting with a full nmap scan on the host and saving the results to a file: ...

TL;DR - An assumed-breach Active Directory box starting with Olivia:ichliebedich. BloodHound maps an ACL chain: Olivia has GenericAll over Michael, Michael can ForceChangePassword on Benjamin, and Benjamin (in Share Moderators) can reach an FTP backup. That backup is a Password Safe vault, cracked to reveal mid-chain users, one of whom (Emily) has GenericWrite over Ethan. A targeted Kerberoast against Ethan cracks his password, and Ethan holds DCSync rights, so secretsdump dumps every hash and a pass-the-hash as Administrator finishes the box. ...

TL;DR - An assumed-breach Active Directory box. Starting from henry, I chain ACLs through BloodHound: a targeted Kerberoast on alfred, abusing AddSelf + ReadGMSAPassword to read the ansible_dev$ gMSA password, then a trail of ForceChangePassword and WriteOwner abuses to pivot sam → john and land a WinRM shell. For root, john controls an OU holding a deleted cert_admin account, so I restore it from the AD Recycle Bin, reset its password, and abuse an ESC15 (CVE-2024-49019) vulnerable certificate template to impersonate the Administrator. ...