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    <title>Acl-Abuse on hallllow</title>
    <link>https://ctf-hallllow.blog/tags/acl-abuse/</link>
    <description>Recent content in Acl-Abuse on hallllow</description>
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      <title>HTB - Administrator</title>
      <link>https://ctf-hallllow.blog/posts/administrator/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://ctf-hallllow.blog/posts/administrator/</guid>
      <description>HTB Administrator (Medium). An assumed-breach AD box: chain ACLs from Olivia through Michael, Benjamin, Emily and Ethan using bloodyAD, crack a Password Safe vault for mid-chain creds, targeted-Kerberoast Ethan, and finish with DCSync for full domain compromise.</description>
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      <title>HTB - Forest</title>
      <link>https://ctf-hallllow.blog/posts/forest/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://ctf-hallllow.blog/posts/forest/</guid>
      <description>HTB Forest (Easy). A read-only domain controller leaks its user list over an SMB null session. One account, svc-alfresco, has Kerberos pre-auth disabled, so we AS-REP roast it, crack the hash, and log in over WinRM. BloodHound then reveals an ACL path to Domain Admin: GenericAll on Exchange Windows Permissions grants WriteDACL over the domain, which we turn into DCSync rights and dump the Administrator hash.</description>
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